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Abstract: India grows rapidly in recent years, not to mention its high-technology industry. What are 
secrets behind this fast-growing situation? This paper intends to find the answer using a firm-level panel 
data in India and examine the loan-productivity relationship via both contemporaneous and lagged models. 
I find positive and statistically significant results that loans play an important role in firms’ performances.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A healthy financial structure and a strong financing system are important factors to a nation’s growth. 
In most developed countries, the financial system not only supports national economic growth but 
also buttresses individuals’ investment. On the contrary, developing countries do not have stable 
financial systems that make people in these areas remain poor, especially for those low-income 
economies. (GNI per capita is less than $1,025)1 India is an exception among these countries for it 
has a relative strong financial system, which allows this nation grow faster. The GDP growth rate 
is 7.6% and the manufacturing growth rate is 9.3% in 2015. The former is 3 times higher than the 
United States and Euro, while, the latter is 2 times higher than these 2 areas. This paper narrows 
down the research scope, which examines the relationship between banking services (lending) in the 
financial system and manufacturing productivities in India. 
Only when we understand the importance between financial system and growth, do we 
realized the connection between banking services and manufacturing productivities. Whether the 
financial system has something to do with the economic growth: This is the question. Two schools 
in the traditional development economics asserted different point of views on this topic. Some 
scholars claimed that financial institutions provided distinctive quality and quantity services and 
explained the reason why countries developed uncommonly (Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; 
Shaw, 1973). While other economists declared that financing was essentially to industries that 
responded other factors, which made cross-country differences in growth (Robinson, 1952). 
Nonetheless, these two thoughts were replaced by the neoclassic economic growth models, one of 
them said it was the output per worker and the saving rates that increased the economic growth 
(Solow, 1956). Based on these pioneers, economists are searching for more evidences not only by 
reinforcing theoretical perspectives but also using various data-types to do the practical analyses. On 
the field of theories, the role of intermediaries is important. The intermediaries enhanced the liquidity 
and funded long-lived projects simultaneously (Bencivenga & Smith, 1991). Additionally, these 
intermediaries had more information about firms and projects that cause higher growth rates 
(Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990).  Except intermediaries, the environment of banks and markets is 
another source, which explains the reason of growth. Banks tended to be better and increased the 
growth when the level of development is low; while markets performed well as income raised (Boyd 
& Smith, 1996). Moreover, banks relied less on the “legal financial system” than markets did (Rajan 
& Zingales, 2001), in other words, banks did better when the entire system is weak, contrarily, 
markets did well when the system is developed (Allen et. al., 2010). 
                                                
1 Source: World Bank, 2015. 
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To test these theoretical thoughts, other economists provided reasonable evidences by 
empirical experiments. The strong relationship between the growth and the financial system was 
found by using data of 80 countries during 1960 – 1989 (King & Levine, 1993). Similar research 
based on the US data to examine whether industries grow faster with better financial system and 
proved that finance is the key to the economic growth (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Based on stock 
markets and firm-level data from 30 countries, the solid evidence showed that the stocks also raise 
the growth (Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). Yet, the above studies would not have convincing results 
after the influential research published in the mid-twentieth century. The paper used the case studies 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, South Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan after World War II and 
provided considerable evidences that better financial systems buttress the economic growth 
(McKinnon, 1973). 
Some scholars found that close bank-firm relationships are credited for reducing agency cost 
and increasing firm access to capital, resulting in improved performance of the firm (Gerschenkron, 
1962; Hoshi et al., 1994). Moreover, these bank-influenced firms enjoy increased access to capital 
through easier access to bank debt or preferential terms on loans and these firms should have better 
performance than independent firms. These relationships lead to higher profitability and higher 
growth rate for bank-influenced firms (Agarwal & Elston, 2001). Yet some argued that as a firm 
works more closely with a bank, it is harder to gain funds via other means and may only be helped 
up by the bank to support its growth. Additionally, with closer bank-firm connection, a bank is 
reluctant to provide funds because it has adverse information about the firm. Therefore, firms should 
diversify their financing sources (Kang & Stulz, 2000). 
Other savants even took deeper examination by studying different financing sources. Internal 
and external funds are not perfect substitutes for reasons including transaction costs, tax advantages, 
etc. A firm with limited or no access to external financing may hinder a firm’s growth (Levine, 2004; 
Knyazeva et al., 2009). In the presence of external constraints, firms depend on internal funds to 
finance growth, instead. While the internal financing on firm growth decreases with an increase in 
the access to an external bank credit facility. Only as the external financing constraints are alleviated, 
will firms rely less on internal funds and switch to external financing as the main source of financing 
for their growth (Rahaman, 2011). Unfortunately, no study has directly analyzed the link between 
increased access to bank financing and firm productivity, especially for smaller firms (Puri et al., 
2014). Yet the most recent paper shed the light on the issue that they found most startups rely heavily 
on the bank-debt financing (Robb & Robinson, 2014). 
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1.1 Indian Banking Structure2 
There are three major changes on Indian banking history: Early phase of Indian banks, from 1786 to 
1969, Nationalization of banks and the banking sector reforms, from 1969 to 1991, and New phase 
of Indian banking system, with reform after 1991. 
 
§ Phase one: Early phase of Indian banks (1786-1969): The first bank in India namely, “General Bank 
of India” was established by British in 1786. After this year, three main banks including Bank of 
Bengal (1809), Bank of Bombay (1840), and Bank of Madras (1843) were formed by the East India 
Company. These three banks were called Presidency banks and operated as an independent unit 
until 1920 that were merged to the Imperial Bank of India, a private European- shareholders. 
Other banks such as Allahabad Bank, Punjab National Bank, Bank of India, and so on throve 
quickly during 1865 to 1913. While the Reserve Bank of India started in 1935. During phase one, 
the growth in banking was slow and these banks experienced periodic failures between 1913 and 
1948, though there were almost 1,000 banks, which were small size. People in this period got 
confused about their decisions and faith and hence the Government of India legislated the 
Banking Companies Act, 1949, which was later viewed as per amending Act of 1965. This act 
bestowed the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) with extensive powers to supervise banks in India and 
become the central banking authority. Yet the public still had less confidence on these banks and 
inclined to Postal department for it offered comparatively safer facilities.  
§ Phase two: Nationalization of banks and the banking sector reforms (1969-1991): The Imperial bank of 
India was nationalized and started providing extensive banking facilities in rural and semi-urban 
area in 1955. After that, the government constituted the State Bank of India and gave it power 
to act as the agent of RBI to deal with banking transactions of the Union and states governments 
all over the nation. Moreover, there were 14 commercial banks nationalized in 1969 and after 
Independence, Indian government took initiatives to reform the banking sectors that 7 more 
banks nationalized in 1980. Consequently, about 80% banks were under the direct ownership of 
Indian government.  
§ Phase three: New phase of Indian banking system (after 1991): This phase is the milestone of banking 
system that introduced more products and facilities to accelerate the reforming process. The 
committee was set up under the chairmanship of M. Narasimham and its efforts were conspicuous 
that the entire nation is flooded with foreign banks and its ATM stations. In addition, with 
                                                
2 The information is from “Growth of Banking Sector in India: A Collective Study of History and its Operations” written by 
Manish Khanna and Saurabh Kaushal (2013). 
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development of technology, the emergence of phone banking and net banking that make financial 
system more efficient and convenient. 
 
Banks are categorized by scheduled and unscheduled. The scheduled banks are listed in the 
second schedule of the RBI Act, 1934. These banks, usually are commercial banks and regional rural 
bank, have a paid-up capital and reserves of an aggregate value, which cannot be less than Rs. 5 
lakhs3; besides, they have to satisfy the RBI that their affairs are carried out in the interest of 
depositors. Co-operative banks can also become a scheduled bank when they satisfy several certain 
criteria. Previous study shows that there were 64,918 branches of scheduled banks on June 30, 1999. 
Surprisingly, branches increase to 92,114, according to the RBI Annual Report 2013-14. This 
phenomenon gives us an obvious truth that commercial banks are momentous to India’s economy. 
By testing the credit and the investment of commercial banks, the credit is 4.78 times than the 
investment in 2013 that indicates the overall performance of the scheduled banks is growing over 
the period (Paul, 2015). Contrarily, unscheduled banks are those not included in the second schedule 
of the RBI Act, 1934. Only three such banks exist in India. To give simpler concept of Indian 
structure, the hierarchy plot is presented in Appendix. 
Due to the unique financial structure and financial reforms, authors examined the efficiency 
of these different types of Indian banks, especially commercial and public banks. The question on 
whether commercial banks is more efficient than the public banks has been debated for a long time. 
Some argued that the performance of Indian scheduled commercial banks as well as the state bank 
group perform effectively than other types of banks (Shanmugam & Das, 2004). And these 
commercial banks comprise more than three-fifth of financial system assets and dominate the whole 
banking sector in India as well as mobilize savings in growth process (Seshadri et al., 2010). Others 
claimed that public sector banks perform better and are more efficient than commercial banks 
(Mukherjee et al., 2002; Ram & Ray, 2004). No matter which bank-type in Indian, they both seem 
efficient in Indian society. 
 
2. Research Method 
 
2.1 Data, Sample Selection, and Construction of Variables  
The primary data used in this study are obtained from the Prowess, which is maintained by the 
Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The Prowess is a large micro database that provides 
panel-level information for 37,545 firms in the manufacturing sector during 1987 and 2016. The 
second database is Indian Open Government Data Platform (OGDP), managed by the Indian 
                                                
3 A lakh is a unit in the Indian numbering system and it equals to 100,000. 
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government, containing national economic indicators. Both state-level, national-level gross domestic 
production (GDP) and GDP deflators are collected in this database at which the base period starts 
from 2004. The third database called Indian Office of the Register General and Census Commissioner 
(ORGCC) provides Indian demographic data on a 10-year-basis census (1991, 2001, 2011). 
The main variables such as the amount of borrowings, the total sales, and the fixed assets 
given by the Prowess database start from 1987 to 2015. Yet most observations of these variables 
prior to 2002 are missing that will be dropped from the sample and the new period is between 2004 
and 2014. In addition to these missing observations, firms with only two-year portfolio are also 
excluded because the performance is difficult to detect in a short time during the expansion period. 
Due to various industrial structures and financial conditions for each state in India, all variables are 
adjusted by the state-level GDP deflator to get the actual quantities. Furthermore, the demographic 
information, especially the population and the literacy rate, from the ORGCC is different in each 
state and has influence on firms’ performance that should be included as controls to have more 
accurate results. Census data in 2001 and 2011 are used in the sample that the former suits years 
before 2011 and the later fits years after 2011.  
 
2.2 Hypothesis and Econometric Model 
According to previous literatures, findings of the causality between firms’ productivities and 
financing from banks are limited that most papers tried to find the correlation first and then aimed 
at the causal effect. In this paper, I also tend to examine the correlations firstly by having three 
hypotheses indicating three method to calculate the productivity of a firm. 
 The first hypothesis utilizes the total sales; the second and the third hypothesis applies the 
gross and net fixed assets, respectively to detect the relation between financing and productivity. In 
these hypotheses, I expect to have the positive relation that a financing-influenced firm has better 
performance on its productivity. 
 The total factor productivity (TFP) model is broadly used to examine the correlation between 
the financing and the productivity; however, the labor factors in the Prowess database are insufficient 
to initiate the TFP model that the alternative model is the simple logarithm linear function presented 
as below. 
 !"($)&'() = + + -.!"(/01"2)&'() + -3!" /01"2&'() ∗ 567&'( )8. + 9:&'(()8.) + 1&'() + ;&'()                
(1) 
 
where an individual firm is indexed i in the industry j at state k for each year t. Output (Y) defines a 
firm’s productivity calculated by the total sales, the gross fixed assets, and the net fixed assets. 
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Borrowings from banks (Loans) are categorized in several groups including the aggregate loans, 
short-term loans, long-term loans; short-term loans from private and public sector banks, and long-
term loans from private and public sector banks. Commercial banks, financial institutions, and so on 
are private sector banks; governmental banks, state-level banks, etc. are public sector banks. These 
two types of banks dominate 70% of financing in India implying the main channel for capital is mostly 
from these banks, which has the highest authority deciding whether or not lend the money to a firm. 
 Instead of adding control variables (state-level population and literacy rate), I also have 
interaction terms referred to state-level real GDP and types of borrowings to test their effects on the 
output that anticipated to be positive. Lastly, fixed effects such as year, industrial type, and state, are 
utilized in the model to correct for the time-invariant conditions that the unobservable factors in the 
past will continuously impact the current and future results, which are less efficient.  
 
3. Result: Do Loans Matter? 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics using the panel data in the sample. The sample of 
Indian manufacturing firms has a mean total sales value of Rs. 28 million. Mean gross fixed assets 
and mean net fixed assets in the sample are around Rs. 19 million and Rs. 11 million, respectively. 
Mean of types of loans reflects the aggregate and the long-term borrowings are the main sources for 
improving firms’ productivities. Panel B of Table 1 also reports the summary statistics in the panel 
data but all variables are transformed into logarithm functions that a negative mean in variables is 
originally zero or near zero. However, both short-term and long-term loans from public banks will 
be excluded from the sample for observations are not sufficient to run the model. This will slightly 
affect my results leading to the misspecification bias; nonetheless, private sector banks are more 
dominated than public sector banks in terms of borrowings for a firm. Panel C of Table 1 reports the 
summary statistics only for control variables in the panel data. Except the literacy rate, which is 
percentage, the real GDP and the population are in logarithm function. 
 
3.2 Benchmark Results 
I use firm-level output calculated in three various methods as a measure of productivity and analyze 
the correlation based on how much loans borrowed from banks whether or not is positive. Table 2 
addresses the results of my Equation (1) with fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered at 
the state-level. Column (1) ~ (5) report results of different loans and their interaction terms when 
the output is the total sales. Coefficients of five types of loans are all highly significant at 1% level, 
and specifically, short-term loans and short-term loans from private sector banks increase the total 
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sales by 30% and 28%, respectively that implying firms prefer short-term loans to have temporary 
investment and keep as the cash flow in case. Coefficients of interaction terms, surprisingly, are 
negative indicating that a firm located at a richer state tends to borrow less from banks and vice 
versa. One of possible reasons is that I apply the total sales as the dependent variable that if a firm is 
profitable this year, it can utilize the revenue itself to do further investments. 
Column (6) ~ (10) report the results when the output is measured by the gross fixed assets 
and most coefficients remain significance at 1% level. Aggregate loans and long-term loans have 
positive correlation with the gross fixed assets but the former is insignificant and the latter is only 
significant at 5% level. Both short-term loans and long-term loans from private sector banks raise 
the gross fixed assets by 22% ~ 23%. Similar results when the dependent variable is net fixed assets 
are reported in Column (11) ~ (15). Loans from private sector banks enhance the net fixed assets by 
30% higher than those in the gross fixed assets. Furthermore, interaction terms are positive but 
insignificant when the dependent variables are gross and net fixed assets and these results infer that 
bigger firm size will have more borrowings from banks.   
 
3.3 Firms in Computer Software Industry 
India is prominence for its high-technology industry and it grows rapidly in the past decade. 
According to the World Bank, high-technology exports is 7.52% of all manufactured exports 
showing that most Indian firms based on high-technology may require massive capital to support 
their productivity. Thus, I analyze firms in the computer software only to detect the relationship and 
do the comparison. 
 Table 3 reports the results using Equation (1) with fixed effects but only for computer 
software firms. Standard errors are robust by state-level clustering. Total sales as the dependent 
variable, coefficients are positive but only short-term loans and long-term loans from private sector 
banks are significant that the former is at 10% level and the latter is at 1% level. In addition to the 
significance, the total sales increased by 75% when the long-term financing is from private sector 
banks. The possible explanation for this high percentage is that long-term loans give them more 
flexibility to invest their R&D. As long as the novel product or technology is launched, the value-
added profit they attain is colossal. The interpretation of interaction terms is the same as those in 
Column (1) ~ (5) of Table 2.  
 The results are totally different from those in Table 2 applying gross and net fixed assets as 
dependent variables. Coefficients are negative though mostly are insignificant inferring the loans 
decline firms’ productivities. Column (7) depicts that the gross fixed assets is decreased by 42%, 
statistically significant at 1% level. Short-term loans are used to do the cash-flow or to invest product 
shortly, while for computer software firms, not until the outcome, a time-capital consumed process, 
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is successful do firms keep borrowing, resulting in shirking their fixed assets. Column (11) ~ (15) 
also show the negative correlation even the results are insignificant. Interaction terms remain 
positive giving the similar interpretation as those in the previous table.  
3.4 Firms in Non-Computer Software Industry 
Results of computer software industry expressed in the previous section surprisingly differ from 
what I expected in which should show positivity. Now, I examine non-computer software firms to 
see any changes happened in these two groups.  
 Table 4 states the results for firms in non-computer software applying a panel data with fixed 
effects and state-level clustered standard errors. Similarly, results, regardless of the measurement of 
the output, are equal to ones in Table 1 that coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
indicating the positive correlation between financing and productivity is not driven by computer 
software firms.  
 
4. Robust Specification 
4.1 One-Year Lag in the Sample 
 !"($)&'() = + + -.!"(/01"2)&'(()8.) + -3!" /01"2&'(()8.) ∗ 567&'( )8. + 9:&'(()8.) + 1&'() + ;&'()
    (2) 
 
The causal effect of loans is not obvious to detect within a year because some firms will have short-
term borrowings (1-month, 12-month, or shorter) to have abrupt effect on the performance or will 
have long-term borrowings (15-month, 2-year, or longer) to have gradually influence on the 
productivity. This is why most paper and I try to detect the correlation at the first place; however, I 
still attempt to find the causality using one-year lag on loans and anticipate to have positive effect on 
the output.  
 Table 5 states the results using Equation (2) with fixed effects. Standard errors are robust by 
state-level clustering. Coefficients remain positive and highly significant but the interpretation is 
that the output increased as an additional percentage change in loans. The total sales raised by 31% 
and 28% as one percentage change in short-term loans and short-term loans from private sector 
banks, separately. The gross fixed assets and the net fixed assets are also increased by 24% ~ 30% as 
an extra percentage change in long-term loans from private sector banks. Interaction terms are 
negative when the dependent variable is the total sales inferring that firms borrow less when they 
are in a state with higher GDP. 
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4.2 One-Year Lag in Computer Software Firms 
I also take the lag for firms in the computer software industry to detect the causal effect. 
Astonishingly, the results mostly equal to ones in Table 3 in which testing the correlation.  
 Table 6 addresses the outcomes in a panel data with fixed effects and state-level clustered 
standard errors. One percentage change in long-term loans from private sector banks enhance the 
total sales by 63% significant at 1% level. Still, for computer software firms, the long-term loans are 
more flexible for both paying back the debts and investing the R&D. Negative coefficients indicate 
that the gross fixed assets are declined due to an extra percentage increased in loans (except the 
short-term loans). Contrarily, the net fixed assets increase as one percentage change in loans, 
excluding the aggregate loans. Also, puzzlingly, all results are insignificant and a reasonable 
explanation is yet to be found. Interaction terms have the same issue as my coefficients in which lose 
significances. 
 
4.3 One-Year Lag in Non-Computer Software Firms 
The analysis in Section 3.4 proves the positive correlation is based on manufacturing firms excluding 
those in the computer software industry. I also want to examine whether the results are consistent 
taking one-year lag. 
 Outcomes reported in Table 7 are identical with Table 4 that coefficients are positive and 
significant at 5% or 1% level implying the productivities increase as an additional percentage change 
in different types of loans. Short-term loans remain important to the total sales (32%) and long-term 
loans from private sector banks are the dominance for both gross and net fixed assets (24% and 30%, 
respectively). 
 
4.4 Geographic Location for Firms: North, South, East, West 
Instead of using state information to locate the positions of firms, here, I apply the geographic 
information, according to the official mapping system of the Indian government, to re-categorize the 
sample and analyze the correlation. 
 Panel A of Table 8 reports the results of firms only in the north using a panel data with fixed 
effects.  Short-term loans and those from the private sector banks are significant at 1% level that the 
total sales increase 23% and 19%. This outcome is consistent with the one in Column (1) ~ (5) of 
Table 1. Results only for firms in the south are showed in Panel B of Table 8 that short-term and 
long-term loans from private sector banks are important to the total sales (25% and 31%). Coefficients 
are positive; however, only the short-term loans are significant for firms in the east that the total 
sales raises by 36%. Results for firms in the west stated in Panel D of Table 8 are almost the same 
but higher than (31% and 28%) those in the north. It seems that short-term loans are vital for firms 
	 10 
regardless of their geographic location. The reason why most of loan-types are insignificant in the 
east remains a conundrum, but one of possible explanations is that the political environment is less 
stable and firms will have more short-term loans to maintain their cash-flows. 
5. Conclusions 
India is thriving rapidly that her GDP growth rate in 2015 is 7.6%, three-times higher than the world 
level (2.7%). In addition to the growth rate, the growth rate in the manufacturing industry also grows 
speedily that is 9.3% in 20154. What is the secret behind these numbers? Indian unique financial 
system may be the answer to this question. According to the RBI Act. 1934, private and public sector 
banks are the dominances in the banking structure that about 70% borrowings are from these two 
types of banks. 
How strong is the banking structure supporting the industrial growths? Literatures 
examining the research topic between the financial structure and the productivity of firms are many, 
but few of them have the solid evidence focusing on the causality. The causal effect of financing, 
borrowings from banks in particular, is rarely happened within a short period. Testing the 
correlation is suitable for this condition that lots of literatures show massive evidences. Therefore, 
this paper aims at examining the relationship between the financing and the productivity in Indian 
manufacturing industry and expecting to find the consistent results.  
The total factor productivity (TFP) model is commonly used in analyzing this topic; however, 
lacking labor endowments in the Prowess database, the logarithm linear model is the alternative 
approach used in this study. Additionally, the sample is a firm-level panel data, including 16,060 firms 
from 2004 to 2014, with fixed effects. I have solid evidences that various types of loans are positively 
correlated with the output measured by the total sales, gross and net fixed assets. Short-term loans 
and loans from private sector banks are more important than other types. In addition to the 
significantly positive correlation, one-year lag analysis also proves that the output increased due to 
an extra percentage change in loans indicating the positive causality. Interaction terms in two 
equation functions are positive except those when the dependent variable is the total sales. 
Coefficients of those interaction terms are negative inferring the existence of diminishing marginal 
effect on the total sales. 
Additionally, I make two subsamples containing firms in computer software and firms in non-
computer software to detect whether or not the consolidate results are due to the high-technology 
firms. Surprisingly, long-term loans including those from the private sector banks are vital to 
computer-software firms. While, non-computer-software firms rely on short-term loans and those 
from private sector banks. Lastly, I re-categorize my sample using the geographic location and find 
                                                
4 Source: World Bank Database 
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that only the short-term loans have statistically positive correlation with the total sales in the north. 
A reasonable explanation for this puzzle is yet to find, but the unstable political environment could 
be one of the reasons.  
This paper shed the light on the topic of the financing system and the productivity in Indian 
manufacturing industry. Yet the process of finding a direct causal effect is not finished that 
economists concentrating on this topic could apply the TFP model to it. Furthermore, utilizing the 
bank-level data, opposite to this paper, would show different angles of this research topic. Last but 
not the least, the exogenous factors such as the politics and the financial policies could be considered 
into the model to have further solid evidences.
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
--- Unit of Loans are Rs. Millions --- 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Total Sales 
Gross Fixed Assets 
Net Fixed Assets 
110,195 
110,195 
110,195 
28.132 
19.442 
11.785 
288.257 
213.227 
119.148 
0.001 
0.001 
-2.493 
25886.22 
16823.8 
11944.58 
Independent Variables 
Aggregate Loans 
Short-term Loans 
Long-term Loans 
110,195 
110,195 
110,195 
5.248 
1.652 
3.596 
87.512 
28.802 
78.718 
-0.767 
0 
-0.767 
11622.64 
6030.03 
11622.64 
Private Short-term Loans 
Private Long-term Loans 
110,195 
110,195 
0.841 
1.521 
20.881 
37.233 
0 
0 
6030.03 
5384.28 
Public Short-term Loans 
Public Long-term Loans 
110,195 
110,195 
0.009 
0.077 
1.522 
6.287 
0 
0 
485.33 
1385.62 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
--- Logarithm Function --- 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Log Total Sales 
Log Gross Fixed Assets 
Log Net Fixed Assets 
110,195 
110,195 
109,094 
0.256 
-0.087 
-0.681 
2.881 
2.492 
2.560 
-7.655 
-7.621 
-7.655 
10.162 
9.731 
9.388 
Independent Variables 
Log Aggregate Loans 
Log Short-term Loans 
Log Long-term Loans 
25,864 
14,551 
14,279 
-0.057 
-0.026 
-0.251 
2.629 
2.465 
2.757 
-7.621 
-7.606 
-7.621 
9.361 
8.705 
9.361 
Log Private Short-term Loans 
Log Private Long-term Loans 
10,292 
8,073 
-0.082 
-0.540 
2.336 
2.885 
-7.621 
-7.601 
8.705 
8.591 
Log Public Short-term Loans 
Log Public Long-term Loans 
51 
501 
-0.111 
0.055 
3.393 
2.573 
-6.949 
-6.507 
6.185 
7.234 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C 
--- Logarithm Function Except the Literacy Rate --- 
Control Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Log Real GDP  
Log Population 
Literacy Rate 
110,195 
109,892 
109,892 
16.617 
18.666 
72.272 
1.083 
1.490 
8.167 
13.263 
13.711 
47 
18.367 
20.752 
94 
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Table 2 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 Total Sales Gross Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Aggregate Loans(t) 
0.134*** 
(0.020)     
0.042 
(0.061)     
0.091 
(0.065)     
Aggregate(t) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005)     
0.013 
(0.016)     
0.007 
(0.017)     
Short-term Loans(t)  
0.304*** 
(0.032)     
0.206*** 
(0.079)     
0.277*** 
(0.070)    
Short (t)* GDP(t-1)  
-0.024*** 
(0.008)     
0.011 
(0.020)     
0.006 
(0.018)    
Long-term Loans(t)   
0.151*** 
(0.018)     
0.196** 
(0.086)     
0.264*** 
(0.083)   
Long(t) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.019*** 
(0.004)     
0.008 
(0.023)     
0.004 
(0.022)   
Private Short-term Loans(t)    
0.284*** 
(0.026)     
0.223*** 
(0.057)     
0.299*** 
(0.046)  
Private Short(t) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.023*** 
(0.009)     
0.004 
(0.018)     
0.002 
(0.017)  
Private Long-term Loans(t)     
0.120*** 
(0.011)     
0.231*** 
(0.065)     
0.303*** 
(0.061) 
Private Long(t) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.007 
(0.007)     
0.006 
(0.019)     
0.001 
(0.018) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.591*** 
(0.026) 
0.538*** 
(0.023) 
0.646*** 
(0.030) 
0.563*** 
(0.022) 
0.632*** 
(0.040)      
     
Real GDP(t-1) 
0.246 
(0.400) 
0.184 
(0.341) 
0.340 
(0.650) 
-0.241 
(0.265) 
0.693 
(0.512) 
0.605* 
(0.333) 
0.759** 
(0.359) 
0.086 
(0.355) 
0.931** 
(0.397) 
0.489 
(0.419) 
0.772** 
(0.372) 
1.047** 
(0.409) 
0.169 
(0.428) 
1.124*** 
(0.415) 
0.537 
(0.433) 
Population 0.149 (0.545) 
-0.069 
(0.591) 
0.706 
(0.703) 
1.329** 
(0.579) 
-0.086 
(0.867) 
0.725 
(0.593) 
0.678 
(0.624) 
0.444 
(0.548) 
0.147 
(0.732) 
0.255 
(0.425) 
0.432 
(0.605) 
0.139 
(0.727) 
0.361 
(0.589) 
-0.135 
(0.807) 
0.184 
(0.462) 
Literacy Rate 0.005 (0.009) 
0.014* 
(0.009) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.011) 
Constant -2.386 1.372 -12.963 -22.227 0.348 -13.130 -12.815 -6.477 -3.171 -4.687 -9.181 -4.684 -6.259 0.826 -4.254 
Num. of Observations 22275 12569 12277 8967 6980 22275 12569 12277 8967 6980 22195 12529 12234 8958 6973 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3 
Subsample: Computer Software 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 Total Sales Gross Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Aggregate Loans(t) 
0.138 
(0.201)     
-0.168 
(0.152)     
-0.134 
(0.190)     
Aggregate(t) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.010 
(0.058)     
0.088** 
(0.040)     
0.085* 
(0.049)     
Short-term Loans(t)  
0.191 
(0.260)     
-0.418*** 
(0.129)     
-0.153 
(0.158)    
Short (t)* GDP(t-1)  
0.024 
(0.077)     
0.217*** 
(0.034)     
0.162*** 
(0.041)    
Long-term Loans(t)   
0.242 
(0.148)     
-0.046 
(0.186)     
0.049 
(0.242)   
Long(t) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.041 
(0.037)     
0.053 
(0.052)     
0.039 
(0.068)   
Private Short-term Loans(t)    
0.385* 
(0.232)     
-0.294 
(0.238)     
-0.122 
(0.243)  
Private Short(t) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.036 
(0.071)     
0.197*** 
(0.072)     
0.166** 
(0.067)  
Private Long-term Loans(t)     
0.748*** 
(0.225)     
-0.181 
(0.232)     
-0.120 
(0.260) 
Private Long(t) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.167*** 
(0.059)     
0.096** 
(0.048)     
0.109** 
(0.051) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.703*** 
(0.061) 
0.611*** 
(0.053) 
0.714*** 
(0.091) 
0.557*** 
(0.043) 
0.567*** 
(0.137) 
          
Real GDP(t-1) 
-1.338 
(2.603) 
-5.030** 
(2.371) 
-0.651 
(3.849) 
-10.873*** 
(3.856) 
-3.610 
(6.709) 
-0.363 
(1.590) 
1.965 
(2.887) 
-3.192** 
(1.354) 
0.816 
(3.305) 
-2.640 
(2.309) 
-0.002 
(2.028) 
3.280 
(2.561) 
-3.831** 
(1.634) 
0.309 
(3.411) 
-3.196 
(3.051) 
Population 4.417 (3.769) 
11.772*** 
(2.720) 
-0.913 
(4.538) 
13.064*** 
(4.583) 
9.155 
(8.771) 
1.202 
(2.797) 
1.502 
(4.883) 
-3.466 
(3.085) 
4.780 
(5.087) 
-6.370 
(4.855) 
2.361 
(3.326) 
0.894 
(6.092) 
-0.196 
(3.244) 
2.162 
(4.995) 
2.519 
(6.064) 
Literacy Rate -0.025 (0.083) 
-0.178*** 
(0.047) 
-0.107 
(0.159) 
-0.314*** 
(0.095) 
-0.215 
(0.181) 
-0.019 
(0.074) 
-0.022 
(0.097) 
-0.185*** 
(0.062) 
-0.023 
(0.112) 
-0.243** 
(0.116) 
-0.007 
(0.100) 
-0.003 
(0.105) 
-0.174** 
(0.085) 
-0.041 
(0.118) 
-0.056 
(0.170) 
Constant -74.876 -189.432 24.990 -189.869 -143.278 -20.634 -31.661 81.497 -88.257 136.704 -43.946 -25.766 22.532 -39.089 -34.867 
Num. of Observations 562 300 316 192 143 562 300 316 192 143 556 299 311 191 143 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 
Subsample: Non-Computer Software 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 Total Sales Gross Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Aggregate Loans(t) 
0.136*** 
(0.019)     
0.040 
(0.060)     
0.090 
(0.063)     
Aggregate(t) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005)     
0.013 
(0.016)     
0.007 
(0.017)     
Short-term Loans(t)  
0.308*** 
(0.030)     
0.210*** 
(0.078)     
0.280*** 
(0.069)    
Short (t)* GDP(t-1)  
-0.026*** 
(0.008)     
0.008 
(0.020)     
0.004 
(0.018)    
Long-term Loans(t)   
0.150*** 
(0.017)     
0.197** 
(0.084)     
0.264*** 
(0.080)   
Long(t) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.019*** 
(0.004)     
0.009 
(0.023)     
0.005 
(0.022)   
Private Short-term Loans(t)    
0.285*** 
(0.025)     
0.223*** 
(0.057)     
0.300*** 
(0.047)  
Private Short(t) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.024*** 
(0.008)     
0.002 
(0.018)     
-0.001 
(0.018)  
Private Long-term Loans(t)     
0.114*** 
(0.012)     
0.230*** 
(0.066)     
0.304*** 
(0.061) 
Private Long(t) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.005 
(0.008)     
0.006 
(0.019)     
0.001 
(0.018) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.588*** 
(0.027) 
0.535*** 
(0.024) 
0.643*** 
(0.032) 
0.564*** 
(0.023) 
0.634*** 
(0.041) 
          
Real GDP(t-1) 
0.273 
(0.375) 
0.237 
(0.330) 
0.376 
(0.601) 
-0.097 
(0.250) 
0.726 
(0.482) 
0.615* 
(0.325) 
0.718** 
(0.342) 
0.151 
(0.331) 
0.885** 
(0.364) 
0.538 
(0.408) 
0.767** 
(0.358) 
0.983** 
(0.406) 
0.227 
(0.401) 
1.081*** 
(0.383) 
0.580 
(0.432) 
Population 0.025 (0.472) 
-0.319 
(0.605) 
0.695 
(0.614) 
1.141* 
(0.643) 
-0.228 
(0.772) 
0.802 
(0.587) 
0.759 
(0.596) 
0.528 
(0.525) 
0.221 
(0.701) 
0.278 
(0.428) 
0.427 
(0.601) 
0.190 
(0.696) 
0.340 
(0.571) 
-0.037 
(0.772) 
0.037 
(0.455) 
Literacy Rate 0.005 (0.009) 
0.017* 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
Constant -0.239 5.625 -12.917 -19.270 2.751 -14.520 -14.146 -8.211 -4.341 -5.277 -9.021 -5.426 -6.058 -0.782 -1.698 
Num. of Observations 21713 12269 11961 8775 6837 21713 12269 11961 8775 6837 21639 12230 11923 8767 6830 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 Total Sales Gross Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Aggregate Loans(t-1) 
0.13*** 
(0.02)     
0.05 
(0.06)     
0.10 
(0.07)     
Aggregate(t-1) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
Short-term Loans(t-1)  
0.31*** 
(0.04)     
0.19** 
(0.09)     
0.26*** 
(0.08)    
Short (t-1) * GDP(t-1)  
-0.03*** 
(0.01)     
0.02 
(0.02)     
0.02 
(0.02)    
Long-term Loans(t-1)   
0.14*** 
(0.01)     
0.19** 
(0.09)     
0.26*** 
(0.08)   
Long(t-1) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.01** 
(0.01)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
0.00 
(0.02)   
Private Short-term Loans(t-1)    
0.28*** 
(0.02)     
0.22*** 
(0.07)     
0.30*** 
(0.06)  
Private Short(t-1) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.03*** 
(0.01)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
0.01 
(0.02)  
Private Long-term Loans(t-1)     
0.12*** 
(0.02)     
0.24*** 
(0.07)     
0.30*** 
(0.06) 
Private Long(t-1) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.01* 
(0.01)     
0.00 
(0.02)     
-0.00 
(0.02) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.60*** 
(0.02) 
0.54*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.02) 
0.56*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.03)           
Real GDP(t-1) 
0.21 
(0.35) 
0.21 
(0.32) 
0.43 
(0.48) 
-0.07 
(0.32) 
0.57 
(0.41) 
0.36 
(0.32) 
0.42 
(0.33) 
0.26 
(0.34) 
0.45 
(0.39) 
0.42 
(0.37) 
0.43 
(0.34) 
0.61* 
(0.34) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.53 
(0.42) 
0.47 
(0.40) 
Population 0.20 (0.69) 
-0.10 
(0.63) 
0.19 
(1.06) 
0.98 
(0.64) 
-0.16 
(1.16) 
0.87 
(0.55) 
0.77 
(0.59) 
0.72 
(0.57) 
0.73 
(0.61) 
0.80* 
(0.46) 
0.73 
(0.54) 
0.48 
(0.61) 
0.85 
(0.68) 
0.62 
(0.74) 
0.93 
(0.58) 
Literacy Rate 0.00 (0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Constant -3.21 2.17 -3.49 -16.25 2.63 -15.02 -13.00 -12.31 -12.05 -14.37 -13.37 -8.95 -15.66 -10.81 -17.34 
Num. of Observations 22156 12525 12185 8909 6946 22156 12525 12185 8909 6946 22076 12480 12147 8903 6939 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 
Subsample: Computer Software 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 Total Sales Gross Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Aggregate Loans(t-1) 
0.13 
(0.14)     
-0.12 
(0.11)     
-0.02 
(0.12)     
Aggregate(t-1) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.01 
(0.04)     
0.07*** 
(0.03)     
0.06** 
(0.03)     
Short-term Loans(t-1)  
0.11 
(0.30)     
0.09 
(0.15)     
0.17 
(0.18)    
Short (t-1) * GDP(t-1)  
0.03 
(0.08)     
0.08** 
(0.04)     
0.08 
(0.05)    
Long-term Loans(t-1)   
0.22 
(0.15)     
-0.14 
(0.10)     
0.03 
(0.15)   
Long(t-1) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.03 
(0.04)     
0.06** 
(0.03)     
0.04 
(0.04)   
Private Short-term Loans(t-1)    
0.45* 
(0.25)     
-0.07 
(0.24)     
0.03 
(0.29)  
Private Short(t-1) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.06 
(0.07)     
0.14** 
(0.06)     
0.13* 
(0.07)  
Private Long-term Loans(t-1)     
0.63*** 
(0.22)     
-0.09 
(0.18)     
0.07 
(0.13) 
Private Long(t-1) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.12** 
(0.05)     
0.05 
(0.04)     
0.03 
(0.02) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.70*** 
(0.06) 
0.64*** 
(0.06) 
0.77*** 
(0.09) 
0.59*** 
(0.04) 
0.60*** 
(0.17)           
Real GDP(t-1) 
-2.92* 
(1.67) 
-2.25 
(1.78) 
-2.51 
(2.23) 
-3.61 
(2.96) 
-8.70*** 
(2.42) 
-1.59 
(2.05) 
2.86 
(2.45) 
-2.59 
(1.67) 
0.37 
(3.56) 
-0.87 
(1.29) 
0.12 
(2.27) 
4.77** 
(2.28) 
-1.55 
(2.56) 
-0.24 
(3.05) 
-1.33 
(1.13) 
Population 4.44
* 
(2.68) 
1.81 
(2.47) 
3.68 
(4.04) 
-7.07** 
(3.39) 
6.36 
(4.30) 
4.73 
(3.80) 
-1.78 
(3.57) 
1.74 
(3.02) 
-4.77 
(6.29) 
1.43 
(4.09) 
3.08 
(4.66) 
-5.99 
(4.01) 
1.42 
(5.28) 
-14.28** 
(6.25) 
7.39 
(5.76) 
Literacy Rate -0.07 (0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.15** 
(0.07) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.19* 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.00 
(0.10) 
-0.15* 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
-0.16 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.16 
(0.13) 
-0.11 
(0.18) 
Constant -68.64 -25.55 -51.08 145.18 -81.41 -83.91 24.69 -16.43 86.36 -14.28 -59.16 99.89 -17.84 268.12 -124.74 
Num. of Observations 554 294 315 183 137 554 294 315 183 137 549 293 311 182 137 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7 
Subsample: Non-Computer Software 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 Total Sales Gross Fixed Assets Net Fixed Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Aggregate Loans(t-1) 
0.14*** 
(0.02)     
0.05 
(0.06)     
0.10 
(0.07)     
Aggregate(t-1) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
Short-term Loans(t-1)  
0.32*** 
(0.04)     
0.18** 
(0.09)     
0.25*** 
(0.08)    
Short (t-1) * GDP(t-1)  
-0.03*** 
(0.01)     
0.02 
(0.02)     
0.01 
(0.02)    
Long-term Loans(t-1)   
0.14*** 
(0.01)     
0.20** 
(0.08)     
0.27*** 
(0.08)   
Long(t-1) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.01** 
(0.01)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
0.00 
(0.02)   
Private Short-term Loans(t-1)    
0.28*** 
(0.02)     
0.21*** 
(0.07)     
0.29*** 
(0.06)  
Private Short(t-1) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.03*** 
(0.01)     
0.01 
(0.02)     
0.01 
(0.02)  
Private Long-term Loans(t-1)     
0.12*** 
(0.02)     
0.24*** 
(0.07)     
0.30*** 
(0.06) 
Private Long(t-1) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.01* 
(0.01)     
0.00 
(0.02)     
-0.00 
(0.02) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.59*** 
(0.02) 
0.54*** 
(0.02) 
0.64*** 
(0.03) 
0.56*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.03)           
Real GDP(t-1) 
0.25 
(0.34) 
0.23 
(0.33) 
0.47 
(0.48) 
-0.03 
(0.32) 
0.63 
(0.40) 
0.38 
(0.31) 
0.38 
(0.32) 
0.33 
(0.31) 
0.44 
(0.37) 
0.41 
(0.38) 
0.42 
(0.34) 
0.53 
(0.35) 
0.29 
(0.40) 
0.52 
(0.41) 
0.46 
(0.40) 
Population 0.08 (0.66) 
-0.17 
(0.64) 
0.09 
(1.06) 
1.07 
(0.67) 
-0.14 
(1.17) 
0.87 
(0.57) 
0.90 
(0.57) 
0.62 
(0.58) 
0.95* 
(0.57) 
0.67 
(0.50) 
0.67 
(0.57) 
0.59 
(0.61) 
0.69 
(0.65) 
0.96 
(0.66) 
0.70 
(0.60) 
Literacy Rate 0.00 (0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Constant -1.17 3.30 -1.92 -18.03 1.99 -14.98 -15.26 -10.74 -15.92 -12.06 -12.27 -10.82 -12.77 -16.87 -13.20 
Num. of Observations 21602 12231 11870 8726 6809 21602 12231 11870 8726 6809 21527 12187 11836 8721 6802 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8 
Panel A – North 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aggregate Loans(t) 
0.082* 
(0.05)     
Aggregate(t) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.009 
(0.02)     
Short-term Loans(t)  
0.226*** 
(0.06)    
Short (t)* GDP(t-1)  
-0.007 
(0.02)    
Long-term Loans(t)   
0.147* 
(0.08)   
Long(t) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.027 
(0.03)   
Private Short-term Loans(t)    
0.187*** 
(0.04)  
Private Short(t) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.011 
(0.01)  
Private Long-term Loans(t)     
0.149** 
(0.07) 
Private Long(t) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.043 
(0.03) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.630*** 
(0.05) 
0.589*** 
(0.05) 
0.714*** 
(0.02) 
0.616*** 
(0.04) 
0.777*** 
(0.06) 
Real GDP(t-1) 
1.247** 
(0.50) 
1.233* 
(0.67) 
1.646*** 
(0.63) 
0.250 
(0.73) 
1.508*** 
(0.58) 
Population -0.754 (1.11) 
-0.832 
(0.88) 
-1.591 
(1.32) 
0.549 
(0.84) 
-3.659*** 
(1.19) 
Literacy Rate 0.038
*** 
(0.01) 
0.057*** 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.034*** 
(0.01) 
0.012 
(0.02) 
Constant 8.735 8.446 21.254 -8.725 50.540 
Num. of Observations 3890 2174 2162 1615 1317 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Continue 
Panel B – South 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aggregate Loans(t) 
0.128** 
(0.06)     
Aggregate(t) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.020 
(0.02)     
Short-term Loans(t)  
0.274* 
(0.15)    
Short (t)* GDP(t-1)  
-0.026 
(0.05)    
Long-term Loans(t)   
0.114 
(0.13)   
Long(t) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.016 
(0.04)   
Private Short-term Loans(t)    
0.250*** 
(0.10)  
Private Short(t) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.018 
(0.03)  
Private Long-term Loans(t)     
0.308*** 
(0.06) 
Private Long(t) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.075*** 
(0.02) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.669*** 
(0.02) 
0.612*** 
(0.01) 
0.744*** 
(0.04) 
0.618*** 
(0.02) 
0.698*** 
(0.02) 
Real GDP(t-1) 
-1.574*** 
(0.35) 
-2.866*** 
(0.69) 
-1.827*** 
(0.62) 
-2.168* 
(1.16) 
-1.300 
(0.95) 
Population 3.787
*** 
(1.34) 
5.859** 
(2.72) 
5.514*** 
(1.80) 
6.294 
(4.08) 
7.720*** 
(2.90) 
Literacy Rate -0.081
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.114** 
(0.05) 
-0.110*** 
(0.03) 
-0.105 
(0.07) 
-0.113** 
(0.05) 
Constant -58.119 -90.761 -87.146 -100.940 -128.303 
Num. of Observations 4491 2503 2531 1801 1436 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Continue 
Panel C – East 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aggregate Loans(t) 
0.175* 
(0.10)     
Aggregate(t) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.026 
(0.03)     
Short-term Loans(t)  
0.359*** 
(0.14)    
Short (t)* GDP(t-1)  
-0.036 
(0.04)    
Long-term Loans(t)   
0.262 
(0.19)   
Long(t) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.052 
(0.05)   
Private Short-term Loans(t)    
0.168 
(0.12)  
Private Short(t) * GDP(t-1)    
0.035 
(0.03)  
Private Long-term Loans(t)     
0.210 
(0.26) 
Private Long(t) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.036 
(0.07) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.514*** 
(0.04) 
0.499*** 
(0.02) 
0.554*** 
(0.04) 
0.480*** 
(0.01) 
0.503*** 
(0.03) 
Real GDP(t-1) 
0.695 
(1.25) 
-1.094 
(1.11) 
1.566 
(0.97) 
-1.935 
(1.99) 
-0.483 
(0.86) 
Population 5.166
*** 
(1.76) 
6.050*** 
(0.98) 
1.867* 
(1.03) 
7.624*** 
(1.08) 
-0.850 
(1.10) 
Literacy Rate -0.016
*** 
(0.00) 
0.008*** 
(0.00) 
-0.015*** 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
Constant -95.061 -108.034 -36.926 -133.826 17.714 
Num. of Observations 1769 1050 940 726 533 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Continue 
Panel D – West 
Dependent Variable: Total Sales 
--- Logarithm on Panel Data, Clustered Standard Errors at State Level --- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aggregate Loans(t) 
0.113** 
(0.06)     
Aggregate(t) * GDP(t-1) 
-0.012 
(0.01)     
Short-term Loans(t)  
0.311*** 
(0.09)    
Short (t)* GDP(t-1)  
-0.025 
(0.02)    
Long-term Loans(t)   
0.168*** 
(0.06)   
Long(t) * GDP(t-1)   
-0.018 
(0.02)   
Private Short-term Loans(t)    
0.279** 
(0.11)  
Private Short(t) * GDP(t-1)    
-0.025 
(0.03)  
Private Long-term Loans(t)     
0.161*** 
(0.04) 
Private Long(t) * GDP(t-1)     
-0.007 
(0.01) 
Gross Fixed Assets(t-1) 
0.551*** 
(0.04) 
0.518*** 
(0.03) 
0.589*** 
(0.04) 
0.565*** 
(0.04) 
0.600*** 
(0.06) 
Real GDP(t-1) 
1.392 
(1.12) 
1.266 
(0.91) 
1.257 
(1.03) 
0.390 
(0.26) 
2.636* 
(1.53) 
Population 1.473
*** 
(0.31) 
1.802*** 
(0.29) 
0.887 
(1.81) 
3.917*** 
(0.38) 
1.962*** 
(0.47) 
Literacy Rate 0.000 (0.01) 
-0.009 
(0.01) 
0.016 
(0.02) 
-0.024*** 
(0.00) 
-0.016 
(0.02) 
Constant -19.291 -23.035 -12.654 -50.911 -25.844 
Num. of Observations 7270 4141 3951 2890 2237 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1 – Indian Banking Structure 
Reserve Bank of  India
(Central Bank and Monetary Authority)
Scheduled Banks
Cooperative Banks
District Central
State
Central
Commercial Banks
Foreign Indian
Private Sector
Public Sector
Non-Scheduled Banks
